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Abstract
When executing their orders, investors are proposed different strategies by brokers
and investment banks. Most orders are executed using VWAP algorithms. Other
basic execution strategies include POV (also called PVol) – for percentage of volume
–, IS – implementation shortfall – or Target Close. In this article dedicated to
POV strategies, we develop a liquidation model in which a trader is constrained to
liquidate a portfolio with a constant participation rate to the market. Considering
the functional forms commonly used by practitioners for market impact functions, we
obtain a closed-form expression for the optimal participation rate. Also, we develop
a microfounded risk-liquidity premium that permits to better assess the costs and
risks of execution processes and to give a price to a large block of shares. We also
provide a thorough comparison between IS strategies and POV strategies in terms
of risk-liquidity premium.
Introduction
Stock traders buy and sell large quantities of shares and cannot ignore the significant
impact their orders have on the market. In practice, traders face a trade-off between
price risk on the one hand and both execution cost and market impact on the other
hand. Traders liquidating too fast indeed incur high execution costs but being too
slow exposes the trader to possible adverse price fluctuations, effectively leading to
liquidation at lower-than-expected prices. For that reason, traders usually split their
large orders into smaller ones to be executed progressively. Research on optimal ex-
ecution – or optimal liquidation – mainly focuses on this issue of optimally splitting
those large orders.
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To provide an optimal rhythm for the liquidation process, the most classical frame-
work is the one developed by Almgren and Chriss in their seminal papers [2, 3, 5].
This framework has largely been used and enriched either to better fit real market
conditions or to enlarge the scope of modeling possibilities. Black-Scholes dynamics
for the price has been considered.1 Attempts to generalize the model to take account
of stochastic volatility and liquidity were made – [1]. Discussions on the optimiza-
tion criterions and their consequences on optimal strategies are also present in the
literature (see for instance [4], [7], [15] and [19]). The CARA (or Mean-variance)
framework is predominant in the literature and it has been studied for instance in
[18], and in [9] that also considers block trade pricing. Very interesting results in
the case of IARA and DARA utility functions are presented in [17]. Following the
seminal paper by Obizhaeva and Wang [16], many authors also tried to model mar-
ket impact in a different fashion, using transient marjet impact models. Eventually,
the literature recently went beyond the question of the optimal rhythm and focused
on the tactical layer, that is on the actual way to proceed, using for instance dark
pools [12, 13, 14] or limit orders [6, 10, 11].
Most of the articles in the literature, be they dedicated to the strategic layer (optimal
scheduling) or to the tactical layer (liquidation over short slices of time), focus on
IS strategies.2 In this article, we consider strategies constrained to have a constant
rate of participation to the market. These execution strategies, called POV or PVol
strategies, are more common in practice than IS strategies, although they are subop-
timal. Strangely, they are not dealt with in the literature and the goal of this paper
is to fill in the blank. Instead of choosing a trading curve as in Almgren-Chriss-like
models for IS strategies, we optimize over one single parameter: the participation
rate. Noticeably, for most functional forms used in practice for the execution cost
function, the optimal participation rate can be found in closed form. This is interest-
ing for at least three reasons. First, for trading, an optimal participation rate is easy
to communicate on and does not need any complex tool to be used in practice as
opposed to the trading curves of most IS strategies. Second, the formula obtained is
a function of risk aversion and it can then be inverted to implicit risk aversion from
traders’ behavior. Third, the closed-form formula obtained for the optimal partici-
pation rate permits to write in closed-form a risk-liquidity premium for block trades.
In effect, transactions involving large blocks of shares cannot be based on Mark-to-
Market (MtM) prices and we provide a microfounded risk-liquidity premium to be
added or subtracted to MtM values. Risk-liquidity premia being already known for
IS strategies (see [9]), we provide a comparison between POV-based liquidity premia
and IS-based liquidity premia.
In Section 1, we present the setup of the model. In Section 2, we compute in
closed-form the optimal participation rate of a POV strategy and the associated
risk-liquidity premium. We then discuss the results and analyze the influence of the
1For short periods of time there is no real difference between Bachelier and Black-Scholes
models.
2We ignore here the literature on VWAP strategies that is rather orthogonal to the classical
literature on optimal execution.
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parameters. In Section 3, we provide numerical examples to illustrate our model.
1 Setup of the model
Let us fix a probability space (Ω,F ,P) equipped with a filtration (Ft)t∈R+ satisfy-
ing the usual conditions. We assume that all stochastic processes are defined on
(Ω,F , (Ft)t∈R+ ,P).
We consider a trader with a portfolio containing q0 > 0 shares of a given stock
3 and
we assume that he is willing to unwind his portfolio. The velocity at which liqui-
dation is carried out depends on market conditions. Among them, market volume
usually has an important role and we introduce a market volume process (Vt)t∈R+ as-
sumed to be continuous, deterministic,4 and such that ∃V > 0, V > 0, ∀t ∈ R+, V ≤
Vt ≤ V .
To model liquidation, we introduce an inventory process (qt)t∈R+ by:
∀t ∈ R+, qt = q0 −
∫ t
0
vsds,
where the strategy (vs)s∈R+ belongs to one of the following admissible sets:
• Either:
AIS,T =
{
(vt)t∈R+ , progressively measurable, ∀t, vt ≥ 0,
∫ T
0
vsds = q0 a.s.
}
,
if one wants to model liquidation using an IS strategy over the time window
[0, T ]. This is the classical Almgren-Chriss framework [2, 3, 5] (see also [9, 18]).
• Or:
APOV =
{
(vt)t∈R+ , ∃ρ > 0, ∀t ≥ 0, vt = ρVt1{∫ t
0
ρVsds≤q0}
}
,
if one wants to model a POV strategy in which the volume traded by the trader
is assumed to be proportional to the market volume process: the participation
rate being ρ.
In both cases, the problem faced by the trader is a trade-off between price risk, en-
couraging to trade fast, and execution cost / market impact, encouraging to unwind
the position slowly.
3The case q0 < 0 can be treated using the same tools.
4The assumption of a deterministic dynamics may seem odd. Practitioners usually consider
market volume curves determined statistically to account for the daily seasonality of market volume.
A multiplicative factor may then be added depending on the expected market activity, but it is
usually deterministic.
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We consider that trades impact market prices in two distinct ways. Firstly, there
is a permanent market impact (assumed to be linear5) that imposes a drift to the
price process (St)t∈R+ :
dSt = σdWt − kvtdt, σ > 0, k ≥ 0.
Secondly, the price obtained by the trader at time t is not St because of what is
usually called instantaneous market impact (or execution costs). To model this, we
introduce a function L ∈ C(R+,R) verifying the following hypotheses:6
• L(0) = 0,
• L is increasing,
• L is strictly convex,
• limρ→+∞ L(ρ)ρ = +∞.
This allows to define the cash process (Xt)t∈R+ as:
Xt =
∫ t
0
(
vsSs − VsL
(
vs
Vs
)
− ψvs
)
ds,
where the execution cost is divided into two parts: a linear part that represents a
fixed cost (ψ ≥ 0) per share – linked to the bid-ask spread for instance –, and a
strictly convex part modeled by L.
One of the main goal of this paper is to maximize over v ∈ APOV the objective
function
J(v) = E [− exp(−γXT )] ,
where T is such that
∫ T
0
vsds = q0 and γ > 0 is the absolute risk aversion parameter
of the trader.
2 Solution of the problem and block trade pricing
2.1 Optimal participation rate
To solve our optimization problem, a first step consists in computing the value of
the cash process during the liquidation process:
Proposition 1. Let us consider ρ > 0 and T implicitly defined by
∫ T
0
ρVsds = q0.
Let us then consider v ∈ APOV defined by ∀t ∈ R+, vt = ρVt1t≤T .
We have:
XT = q0S0 − ψq0 − k
2
q20 −
L(ρ)
ρ
q0 + σρ
∫ T
0
∫ T
t
VsdsdWt
5See [8].
6We want to cover the cases L(ρ) = ηρ1+φ for η > 0 and φ > 0.
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In particular, XT is normally distributed with mean
q0S0 − ψq0 − k
2
q20 −
L(ρ)
ρ
q0
and variance
σ2ρ2
∫ T
0
(∫ T
t
Vsds
)2
dt.
Proof:
By definition,
XT =
∫ T
0
vsSsds−
∫ T
0
VsL
(
vs
Vs
)
ds− ψ
∫ T
0
vsds
= q0S0 − qTST − k
∫ T
0
vsqsds+
∫ T
0
σqsdWs − L (ρ)
∫ T
0
Vsds− ψ
∫ T
0
vsds
= q0S0 − k
2
(
q20 − q2T
)− L (ρ) ∫ T
0
Vsds+
∫ T
0
σqsdWs − ψq0.
Now,
qt = q0 − ρ
∫ t
0
Vsds = ρ
∫ T
0
Vsds− ρ
∫ t
0
Vsds = ρ
∫ T
t
Vsds,
and therefore
XT = q0S0 − ψq0 − k
2
q20 −
L (ρ)
ρ
q0 + σρ
∫ T
0
∫ T
t
VsdsdWt.
Since (qt)t is deterministic, we obtain that XT is normally distributed with mean
q0S0 − ψq0 − k
2
q20 −
L(ρ)
ρ
q0
and variance
σ2ρ2
∫ T
0
(∫ T
t
Vsds
)2
dt.
This proposition permits to write the objective function J in closed-form:
Proposition 2. Let us consider ρ > 0 and T implicitly defined by
∫ T
0
ρVsds = q0.
Let us then consider v ∈ APOV defined by ∀t ∈ R+, vt = ρVt1t≤T .
J(v) = − exp
(
−γ
(
q0S0 − ψq0 − k
2
q20 −
L(ρ)
ρ
q0 − γ
2
σ2ρ2
∫ T
0
(∫ T
t
Vsds
)2
dt
))
.
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Proof:
Using Proposition 1, we know that
E [− exp(−γXT )] = − exp
(
−γE[XT ]− γ
2
2
V[XT ]
)
= − exp
(
−γ
(
q0S0 − ψq0 − k
2
q20 −
L(ρ)
ρ
q0 − γ
2
σ2ρ2
∫ T
0
(∫ T
t
Vsds
)2
dt
))
.
A consequence of this proposition is that the problem boils down to minimizing:
J : R∗+ → R
ρ 7→ L(ρ)
ρ
q0 +
γ
2
σ2ρ2
∫ T
0
(∫ T
t
Vsds
)2
dt, where T satisfies ρ
∫ T
0
Vsds = q0.
Proposition 3. There exists ρ∗ > 0 such that J has a global minimum in ρ∗.
Proof:
To prove this results, we just need to prove that limρ→0 J (ρ) = limρ→+∞ J (ρ) =
+∞.
We know that L has superlinear growth. Hence limρ→+∞
L(ρ)
ρ
q0 = +∞ and therefore
limρ→+∞ J (ρ) = +∞.
As far as the limit in 0 is concerned, let us notice that:∫ T
0
(∫ T
t
Vsds
)2
dt ≥ V 2T
3
3
.
Also,
ρ2 =
q20(∫ T
0
Vsds
)2 ≥ q20
V
2
T 2
.
Hence,
ρ2
∫ T
0
(∫ T
t
Vsds
)2
dt ≥ V
2
3V
2T →ρ→0 +∞.
This gives limρ→0 J (ρ) = +∞.
Proposition 3 only states that there exists an optimal rate of participation. In-
terestingly, when one considers the execution cost functions used in practice and
approximates the volume curve by a flat volume curve, there is a unique constant
participation rate that can be obtained in closed-form:
Proposition 4. Let us consider the special case where:
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• the execution function L is given by L(ρ) = ηρ1+φ,
• the market volume is assumed to be constant: Vt = V .
Then, there is a unique participation rate minimizing J given by:
ρ∗ =
(
γσ2
6ηφ
q20
V
) 1
1+φ
.
Proof:
In the special case we consider, we can simplify the expression for J :
J (ρ) = L(ρ)
ρ
q0 +
γ
2
σ2ρ2V 2
T 3
3
.
Now, since q0 = ρV T , we have:
J (ρ) = ηρφq0 + γ
6
σ2
q30
ρV
.
This function clearly has a minimum at ρ∗ given by the first order condition:
ηφρ∗φ−1 =
γ
6
σ2
q20
ρ∗2V
,
i.e.:
ρ∗ =
(
γσ2
6ηφ
q20
V
) 1
1+φ
.
The expression we obtained in Proposition 4 for the optimal participation rate allows
to carry out comparative statics. However, before going into comparative statics,
several general remarks deserve to be made. First, the formula for ρ∗ is not bounded
by 1. This is natural because we considered a constant participation rate with re-
spect to the market volume that does not take into account our own volume. Second,
most of the literature does not say anything about the value of the risk aversion pa-
rameter γ. We see our closed-form formula as a way to implicit γ from traders’
behavior. Then the formula is useful to be coherent across stocks. Third, the opti-
mal participation rate does not depend on ψ, nor on k. Both the linear part of the
execution cost and the (linear) permanent market impact have indeed to be paid
independently of the participation rate.
Now, concerning the other parameters, we have the following results:
• When the risk aversion parameter γ increases, the trader has an incentive to
execute faster to reduce price risk.
• The same reasoning applies to σ. If volatility increases, the trader wants to
trade faster.
7
• Since a trader with a larger inventory is exposed to more price risk, the optimal
participation rate has to be an increasing function of q0.
• V measures the overall liquidity of the stock. The instantaneous volume exe-
cuted by the trader is ρ∗V =
(
γσ2
6ηφ
q20
) 1
1+φ
V
φ
1+φ and this expression is increasing
with V . It means that the more liquid the stock, the faster we liquidate the
portfolio.
• η is a scale parameter for the execution costs paid by the trader. If η increases,
the trader liquidates more slowly.
• φ measures the convexity of the execution cost function. As long as we are in
the relevant case ρ∗ ≤ 1, the above expression for the optimal participation
rate is a decreasing function of φ. It means that the more convex L is, the
slower the liquidation process. This is in line with the intuition.
2.2 Block trade pricing and risk-liquidity premium
In addition to the closed form expression for the optimal participation rate, an
important question is the total cost of liquidation when one uses the optimal par-
ticipation rate. The framework we develop permits to give a price to a block trade
of q0 > 0 shares and hence to give a price to liquidity. This is done using the notion
of certainty equivalent, or equivalently using indifference pricing – since we are in a
CARA framework. We implicitly define the price P (q0) of a block trade with q0 > 0
shares through the certainty equivalent of XT :
sup
v∈APOV
E [− exp(−γXT )] = − exp(−γP (q0)).
This gives:
P (q0) = q0S0 − ψq0 − k
2
q20 − inf
ρ>0
J (ρ).
The risk-liquidity premium, is then:
ℓPOV (q0) = q0S0 − P (q0) = ψq0 + k
2
q20 + inf
ρ>0
J (ρ).
Under the hypotheses of Proposition 4, we obtain the price of a block trade in
closed-form.
Proposition 5. Let us consider the special case where:
• the execution function L is given by L(ρ) = ηρ1+φ,
• the market volume is assumed to be constant: Vt = V .
Then:
P (q0) = q0S0 − ψq0 − kq
2
0
2
− (1 + φ)η 11+φ
(
γσ2
6φV
) φ
1+φ
q
1+3φ
1+φ
0 .
8
Proof:
infρ>0 J (ρ) = J (ρ∗) = ηρ∗φq0 + γ6σ2
q30
ρ∗V
. If we plug the expression for ρ∗ into this
equation we get:
ηρ∗φq0 = η
1
1+φ
(
γσ2
6φV
) φ
1+φ
q
1+3φ
1+φ
0
and
γ
6
σ2
q30
ρ∗V
= φη
1
1+φ
(
γσ2
6φV
) φ
1+φ
q
1+3φ
1+φ
0
Hence,
P (q0) = q0S0 − ψq0 − kq
2
0
2
− (1 + φ)η 11+φ
(
γσ2
6φV
) φ
1+φ
q
1+3φ
1+φ
0 .
This proposition permits to write the risk-liquidity premium as:
ℓPOV (q0) = k
q20
2
+ ψq0 + η
1
1+φ
(
γσ2
6φV
) φ
1+φ
q
1+3φ
1+φ
0 + φη
1
1+φ
(
γσ2
6φV
) φ
1+φ
q
1+3φ
1+φ
0
The first term corresponds to unavoidable costs, independent of any optimization,
linked to permanent market impact. The second and third term corresponds to the
execution costs paid when using the optimal constant participation rate ρ∗. The
fourth term corresponds to market risk and it is an implicit cost that should be
priced when large blocks of shares are traded. This risk-liquidity premium depends
on the parameters in the following way:
• The higher the risk aversion γ, the higher the risk-liquidity premium. This is
not surprising and almost a direct consequence of the definition of the risk-
liquidity premium. The more risk adverse a trader is, the higher risk-liquidity
premium he should quote to compensate for the risk.
• Similarly, the more volatile the market, the higher the risk-liquidity premium.
In a highly volatile market, the trader quotes a high risk-liquidity premium to
compensate for price risk.
• Due to convexity and superlinearity in liquidation cost, the last two terms
exhibit a convex (increasing) and superlinear behavior with respect to q0. This
is also the case of the first term linked to permanent market impact.
• As far as V is concerned, the more liquid a market, the lower the risk-liquidity
premium.
• The higher the execution costs (i.e. the higher η), the higher the risk-liquidity
premium.
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• With respect to the degree of convexity φ of the execution cost function L, the
risk-liquidity premium turns out to be decreasing as long as ρ∗ ≤ 1.
Interestingly, we can compare the risk-liquidity premium obtained when liquidation
is constrained to be at constant participation rate (POV strategy), and when there
is no constraint (IS strategy). In [9], the risk-liquidity premium in the case of a
time-unconstrained IS strategy is given by:
ℓIS(q0) = q0S0 − lim
T→+∞
−1
γ
log
(
inf
v∈AIS,T
E [exp(−γXT )]
)
=
k
2
q20 + ψq0 +
(1 + φ)2
1 + 3φ
η
1
1+φ
(
γσ2
2φV
) φ
1+φ
q
1+3φ
1+φ
0 .
The only difference is obviously in the terms linked to the optimization of the liqui-
dation process. Because the liquidation strategy is unconstrained, the last term in
the expression of ℓIS(q0) is lesser than the last two terms of ℓPOV (q0). Interestingly,
we can bound from below the ratio of the liquidity premia:
Proposition 6.
ℓIS(q0)
ℓPOV (q0)
≥ 1 + φ
1 + 3φ
3
φ
1+φ ≥ e log(3)
2
√
3
≥ 0.86
Proof:
ℓIS(q0)
ℓPOV (q0)
=
k
2
q20 + ψq0 +
(1+φ)2
1+3φ
η
1
1+φ
(
γσ2
2φV
) φ
1+φ
q
1+3φ
1+φ
0
k
q2
0
2
+ ψq0 + (1 + φ)η
1
1+φ
(
γσ2
6φV
) φ
1+φ
q
1+3φ
1+φ
0
≥
(1+φ)2
1+3φ
η
1
1+φ
(
γσ2
2φV
) φ
1+φ
q
1+3φ
1+φ
0
(1 + φ)η
1
1+φ
(
γσ2
6φV
) φ
1+φ
q
1+3φ
1+φ
0
=
1 + φ
1 + 3φ
3
φ
1+φ
Let us define g(φ) = 1+φ
1+3φ
3
φ
1+φ for φ > 0. g is a U-shaped function, the minimum
being reached at φ∗ implicitly defined by:
g′(φ∗) = 3
φ∗
1+φ∗
(
− 2
(1 + 3φ∗)2
+
log(3)
(1 + 3φ∗)(1 + φ∗)
= 0
)
This gives φ∗ = 2−log(3)
3 log(3)−2 . Now, g(φ) ≥ g(φ∗) = e log(3)2√3 and this proves the result.
The above Proposition means in practice that the gain in going from a POV execu-
tion strategy to an IS execution strategy is bounded from above by 14% in terms of
risk-liquidity premium7. Interestingly, φ∗ ≃ 0.7 and this is close to the value usually
considered by practitioners.
7This bound depends obviously on our assumptions
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3 Numerical examples
To exemplify our model, we compute optimal participation rates and risk-liquidity
premia for 6 liquidation cases involving Total, Axa and Danone, using a market
impact model calibrated on real transaction data.
For each stock, we consider two trades representing respectively 10% and 15% of the
average daily volume. The input data table is the following:8
Total Axa Danone
Characteristics of the stock
Price 40 13 50
Average Daily Volume (in million shares) 4 7 1.7
Annualized volatility 18% 22% 18%
Market impact model
η 0.116 0.046 0.145
φ 0.63 0.63 0.63
ψ 0.002 0.0007 0.003
k 5.8× 10−7 1.9× 10−7 2.7× 10−6
Risk aversion γ = 3× 10−6
The resulting optimal participation rate ρ∗ is given in the following table, along
with the POV-based premium ℓPOV and the IS-based premium ℓIS. For the POV-
based premium, we decompose it into three parts according to the definition of the
risk-liquidity premium:
ℓPOV (q0) = k
q20
2︸︷︷︸
permanent market impact
+ψq0 + η
1
1+φ
(
γσ2
6φV
) φ
1+φ
q
1+3φ
1+φ
0︸ ︷︷ ︸
instantaneous market impact
+φη
1
1+φ
(
γσ2
6φV
) φ
1+φ
q
1+3φ
1+φ
0︸ ︷︷ ︸
risk
Total Axa Danone
q0 (with respect to ADV) 10% 15% 10% 15% 10% 15%
Optimal Participation Rate 17.1% 28.1% 13.7% 22.5% 11.6% 19.1%
Perm. m.i. component (bps) 29.0 43.5 51.2 76.8 45.9 68.8
Inst. m.i. component (bps) 10.1 13.6 10.7 14.4 8.0 10.8
Risk component (bps) 6.0 8.2 6.4 8.7 4.7 6.4
POV-based premium (bps) 45.1 65.3 68.3 99.9 58.6 86.0
IS-based premium (bps) 43.0 62.4 66.0 96.8 57.0 83.8
We see that the permanent market impact component represents a large part of the
POV-based premium. Hence, there is only little difference in terms of costs between
a POV strategy and an IS strategy for the stocks we consider and for the level of
risk aversion we consider.
8We round figures to ease readability.
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Conclusion
Instead of optimizing over all liquidation trading curves as for a time-unconstrained
IS strategy, this paper deals with the optimal rhythm to liquidate a portfolio using
a constant participation rate (POV strategy). We showed that for most functional
forms used in practice for the execution cost function L, a closed-form expression
was available for the optimal participation rate. We then derived the price of a
block trade in this framework and discuss the difference between the risk-liquidity
premium quoted by a trader who trade at the optimal constant participation rate
and the risk-liquidity premium quoted by a trader using the classical trading curve
of an Almgren-Chriss like model.
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